A people may have their state denied without there being any official rejection of its independence. Its land may be broken up, its capital cut off, its connections severed, and its possibilities limited by actions that slowly change the map. This is the full meaning of the Israeli E1 settlement plan. What seems like a program of building homes has consequences well beyond mere housing; it poses a challenge to the very territorial basis that an independent Palestinian state would need to stand upon.
The international community has consistently supported the two-state solution, but the geographic circumstances that would make such a solution possible are increasingly under threat. The E1 plan makes this inconsistency glaringly apparent. It poses the basic question that must be asked of international diplomacy: How much worth does the idea of statehood have when the territory needed to uphold it is being systematically broken up? For Pakistan, the question is inseparable from the country’s long-standing support for the establishment of an independent, sovereign, and contiguous State of Palestine along the pre-1967 borders, with Al-Quds Al-Sharif as its capital.
Map as a Tool of Politics
The significance of the E1 project lies in its location. The approximately 12-square kilometre piece of land lies between occupied East Jerusalem and the Ma’ale Adumim settlement blocs and occupies a strategic corridor in the occupied West Bank. Its execution would further cut East Jerusalem off from other parts of Palestine and interfere with the connection between the north and south regions of the West Bank. The United Nations has particularly stated that implementation of the project will cause a huge impact on territorial contiguity and present an existential danger to the two-state solution.
The E1 project includes 3,401 settlement units. Israel launched a tender for 1,234 units in August 2026, while the rest 2,167 are expected to go into tender in October. This shows that the project is undergoing critical stages of implementation, although the conclusion of the tender cannot be taken as the conclusion of construction. It is not just the numbers of housing units that determine the importance of E1, but it is the cumulative impact of expansion on the geographical layout of Palestine. Contiguity is not just a map choice; it is a requirement for whether the future government could rule its land, for whether communities could stay connected, and for whether a state could exist as a viable political and economic entity.
This is why the E1 project becomes a matter of strategy rather than construction. The creation of a state that has a non-contiguous land mass and where East Jerusalem is becoming increasingly disconnected from the West Bank would suffer significant obstacles to sovereignty, connectivity, and governance. It may gain its recognition through diplomatic means, but this is not sufficient to make up for lost contiguity.
Henri Lefebvre’s theories on the production of spaceberlin can provide a useful analytical framework here: space is not just the environment where politics occurs; it is also a function of political power and politics itself, of decisions made about the configuration of territory. Cautiously applied to Palestine, this concept explains why it is important for a population what sort of infrastructure has been created there. The key point, thus, is not only what E1 would build, but what it will make impossible.
Failed Negotiations as Lessons of History
Territorial disputes teach us that successful political arrangements do not rely solely on the readiness of the disputing parties to engage in negotiations. The case of the division of Berlin during the Cold War era can serve as a very limited but useful example of what division of territories can mean politically for decades to come. Of course, the situation was different, and no direct comparison between Palestine and Berlin should be made, but the value of the example is in a very specific message: once division becomes entrenched through the use of physical infrastructure, its effects go well beyond the initial political decision.
However, in the case of Palestine, there is an additional danger that is posed by settlement expansion. The danger here lies in altering the territorial framework within which any possible agreement can take place. With the continuation of current trends, the diplomatic challenge will be not how the two states might exist alongside each other, but how the viability of the Palestinian state can be ensured under a changed territorial framework.
This means that the issue of a final-status agreement alone is not enough to solve the problem at hand. In addition to dialogue, diplomacy needs not just communication, but also the maintenance of options. Where these options are gradually reduced through ongoing events, the price that will have to be paid to reach an agreement is greater. E1 is a test of whether diplomacy can maintain its credibility where the conditions that allow it to succeed are undermined by the very act of pursuing it.
Manifesting International Law
It is evident that there is an international legal regime governing Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. In December 2016, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2334 that recognized that the Israeli settlements established in territories occupied since 1967, including East Jerusalem, have no legal standing and are a flagrant violation of international law. The resolution calls for an immediate and complete cessation of the Israeli settlement activities and notes that the alteration of the 4 June 1967 lines would not be recognized unless agreed upon by the concerned parties through negotiations.
The advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in July 2024 further elaborated on the international legal obligations resulting from the unlawful Israeli occupation of the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Further reporting by the UN has warned of the implications of Israeli settlements expansion and actions taken in connection with them.
It is important because they dispute the claim that something which happens on the ground can become legitimate just through persistence. Time alone will not make an unlawful situation legal. The existence of a process of peace will not exempt Israel from its obligations under international law.
Also, it is necessary to look at the E1 development project within the context of displacement in the West Bank, settler violence, and the humanitarian disaster in Gaza. This is because all these issues belong to the larger problem of violation of the rights of the Palestinians and the integrity of their territory. Gaza cannot be seen in isolation from the rest of Palestine including West Bank and East Jerusalem.
This means that the international community faces a challenge of consistency in dealing with the conflict. If international diplomacy supports the two-state solution but at the same time fails to address developments undermining its territorial basis, then diplomacy will become ineffective.
Pakistan’s Position and the Importance of a Joint Stance
The stance of Pakistan with regard to Palestine is based on the inalienable right of the Palestinian people to their right of self-determination and creation of an independent, sovereign and contiguous Palestinian state within the pre-1967 boundaries with Al-Quds Al-Sharif as its capital. This stance has continued to be consistent in all of the engagements of Pakistan with the UN, the OIC and other international fora.
With regard to E1, the response of Pakistan is also clear. On 21 August 2026, Pakistan along with Egypt, Türkiye, Indonesia, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE explicitly rejected the E1 settlement project. In their joint declaration, they have stated that the project endangers the geographical contiguity of the Occupied Palestinian Territory and the creation of an independent Palestinian state.
This joint position becomes the basis of more effective diplomacy. Pakistan and its allies should insist on the persistent attention to E1 within the UN, coordination of efforts to prevent illegal construction of settlements and impose accountability in line with the international law. The goal is to have consequences of settlement policies diplomatically and politically, rather than having this development mentioned only in statements but ignored in actions.
However, this approach needs to be combined with an adequate stance on Gaza. Pakistan’s endorsement of the peace process needs to remain connected with its proper implementation, political self-determination of the Palestinians and a path to statehood that cannot be reversed. International frameworks, such as the proposed Board of Peace, may contribute to rebuilding and governance structures, as long as they do not undermine the right of the Palestinians to decide their future.
In terms of Pakistani diplomacy, it becomes a matter of principle and credibility. In order to support a two-state solution, Pakistan needs to stand up for the necessary preconditions of it being achieved. It is not sufficient to support the needed result when its geographic precondition is under pressure.
Is International Law Capable of Stopping the Inevitable?
The E1 plan demonstrates the inherent paradox of international diplomacy. States persist in their support for a Palestinian state, while the expansion of settlements poses a threat to the very land in which this state might take form. The problem today is no longer only whether the international community supports the right of Palestinians to statehood. It is whether it will take steps to maintain the ability to exercise this right.
Efforts should start by stopping the erosion of territorial contiguity, ensuring the safety of Palestinians, and maintaining the principle of the inadmissibility of occupation and changing the status of territories through settlement building. Efforts should also protect the linkage of Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem as indispensable elements of a future Palestinian state.
For Pakistan, the position does not change: Palestinian land cannot be divorced from Palestinian sovereignty. Any political solution which fails to provide Palestinians with a feasible territorial base would fail to give them self-determination as required by international law.
The biggest problem with E1 is not just the construction that might happen there, but rather what could end up being too politically difficult to construct: a contiguous and sovereign Palestinian state. For the international community to truly pursue the goal of a two-state solution, it must go beyond reiterating its principles and actually work toward securing the territorial framework upon which these principles depend. What will determine the future of a Palestinian state will not be only the promises made at negotiating tables but also the world’s willingness to stop the map from making the decision first.
